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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





on behalf of Denzel Morrison,
                                                   Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv–3426)
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 31, 2008
Before:  RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK,* District Judge.
(Filed: March 11, 2008) 
__________________
       * Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.    
2__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Stacey Morrison, on behalf of her now-seventeen-year-old son, Denzel, appeals the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey’s affirmance of the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Denzel’s application for child Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) benefits.  
Denzel suffers from bronchial asthma; multiple exostoses on different parts of his
skeleton, including his legs, head, and ribs; and reactive depression/dysthymic disorder. 
Exostoses are benign bony growths that can cause varying degrees of pain and
discomfort, can reappear if removed through surgery, and can grow to the size of a
baseball.  Denzel walks with a limp, apparently due to surgery that he had in 1996 to
excise exostoses.  Reactive depression/dysthymic disorder is marked by depressed mood,
blunted affect, periods of restlessness, a soft-spoken nature, and anger episodes.  
Denzel’s application for benefits, filed in early 2003, was denied initially and upon
reconsideration by the local Social Security Administration office.  After Ms. Morrison
subsequently requested a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that
Denzel was not disabled for SSI purposes and thus was not entitled to benefits.  Ms.
Morrison appealed to the Appeals Council, which rejected her request to review the
ALJ’s decision.  She then appealed to the District Court, which, as noted above, affirmed
3the denial of benefits.  For the reasons discussed below, we will in turn affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(3) and we now have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In situations
like this, in which the Appeals Council has denied the appellant’s request to review the
ALJ’s denial of benefits, we review the decision of the ALJ.  Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d
589, 582 (3d Cir. 2001).  In doing so, we apply the same standard as the District Court:
we review all legal issues de novo and all factual findings for substantial evidence.  Jones
v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004); Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir.
2000).  Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Jones, 364 F.3d at 503.  In order to allow us
to conduct our review, the ALJ must give a reasoned explanation for his decision,
including how he factored in evidence that arguably pointed to the opposite conclusion. 
Burnett v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2000); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
705 (3d Cir. 1981).  In Jones, we made clear that the purpose of this requirement is “to
ensure sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit
meaningful review.”  364 F.3d at 505.  The ALJ does not need “to use particular language
or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.”  Id.  
A child under eighteen is only eligible for SSI benefits if (1) he is not doing
substantial gainful activity; (2) he has a medically determinable impairment or
    A “marked” limitation “interferes seriously with [the child’s] ability to independently1
initiate, sustain, or complete activities.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added). 
An “extreme” limitation “interferes very seriously with [the child’s] ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.”  Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i) (emphasis
added).
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combination of impairments that is severe; and (3) the impairment or combination of
impairments meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the severity of one or more of
the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.  20 C.F.R
§ 416.924.  An impairment or combination of impairments functionally equals a listed
impairment if it causes a “marked” limitation in two of six areas of functioning or an
“extreme” limitation in one of those six areas.   Id. § 416.926a(a).  The six areas are1
(1) acquiring and using information, (2) attending and completing tasks, (3) interacting
and relating with others, (4) moving about and manipulating objects, (5) caring for
oneself, and (6) health and physical well-being.  Id. § 416.926a(b)(1).
The ALJ found that Denzel was not engaged in substantial gainful activity and that
his three impairments were all severe.  However, the ALJ also found that none of the
impairments — whether on their own or in combination with one another — met,
medically equaled, or functionally equaled a listed impairment.  
Of Denzel’s three impairments, there are only listings for asthma.  20 C.F.R. pt.
404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 3.03, 103.03.  The ALJ found that Denzel’s condition did not
meet these listings, as there was no evidence of pulmonary-function testing, emergency
room visits, inpatient hospitalization, intravenous antibiotics, prolonged inhalation
5therapy, or chronic wheezing.  See id.
Since there is no listing for exostoses, the ALJ analyzed whether Denzel’s
condition was medically equivalent to what he thought were the most analogous listed
impairments — “major dysfunction of a joint,” “fracture of the femur, tibia, pelvis, or one
or more of the tarsal bones,” and “fracture of an upper extremity.”  20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 1.02, 1.06, 1.07, 101.02, 101.06, 101.07.  The ALJ concluded that
Denzel’s condition was not medically equivalent to any of these because, inter alia, he
did not have the “inability to ambulate effectively,” which is a basic requirement for all
listed musculoskeletal impairments.  See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§§ 1.00(B)(2), 101.00(B)(2).  As the regulations explain, the “inability to ambulate
effectively” comprises “an extreme limitation of the ability to walk” and is generally
defined as “having insufficient lower extremity functioning to permit independent
ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits the function of
both upper extremities.”  Id.  The ALJ acknowledged that Denzel “experienced periods of
difficulty walking of varying lengths, did receive home tutoring for a couple of months in
2003 as a result, has been provided with handicapped bus transportation for school, has
been given a key to operate the elevator at school, and has received a special
accommodation at school for fire drill evacuations.”  (App. 25.)  However, the ALJ found
that these factors were outweighed by the fact that Denzel walked home from school
(even though he had the option to take the handicapped bus) and generally participated in
6gym, including playing basketball, volleyball, and baseball.
The ALJ also compared Denzel’s condition to the listings for mood and affective
disorders, which he thought were the most analogous to reactive depression/dysthymic
disorder.  20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.04, 102.04.  The ALJ provided an
extensive explanation for why Denzel’s condition was not medically equivalent to either
listing, including a criterion-by-criterion analysis of why Denzel does not have a major
depressive syndrome and why his depression does not limit his mental functioning to the
degree required by § 12.04 and § 102.04.  Among other things, the ALJ found it
significant that Denzel enjoyed playing games, was interested in his school work and
generally received good grades, had a few friends, was on student council, cared for his
grooming and hygiene the same as other children his age, was generally cooperative
during his periodic psychotherapy sessions, was able to self-cope, and had no difficulty
concentrating, no fatigue, and no suicidal thoughts.  Moreover, in March 2003, Denzel’s
teacher could not identify any limitation in the areas of interacting and relating with
others or caring for oneself.
Finally, the ALJ determined that Denzel’s impairments were not functionally
equivalent to any listed impairment.  Specifically, he found that Denzel’s impairments
caused no limitation in the domains of acquiring and using information, attending and
completing tasks, and caring for oneself, and caused less-than-marked limitations in the
domains of interacting and relating with others, moving about and manipulating objects,
     The DDS doctors did not have before them documentation about Denzel’s depression. 2
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and health and physical well-being.  Once again, the ALJ provided a significant
explanation for his conclusion, some of which referred back to his analysis of why
Denzel’s condition did not meet or medically equal any listed impairment. 
Throughout, the ALJ gave substantial weight to the opinions of the doctors from
the state’s Disability Determination Service (“DDS”), who thought that Denzel’s
exostoses and asthma did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed
impairment.  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f).  2
Ms. Morrison makes a number of arguments on appeal.  First, she contends that, in
conducting his medical equivalence analysis, the ALJ compared Denzel’s exostoses to the
wrong condition.  She maintains that the most similar listing was for “deficit of
musculoskeletal function due to deformity or musculoskeletal disease,” entailing
“walking [that] is markedly reduced in speed or distance despite orthotic or prosthetic
devices,” and that Denzel’s condition is medically equivalent to it.  However, this is
former listing 101.03, which was eliminated when the listings were amended in 2001. 
See Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System
and Related Criteria, 66 Fed Reg. 58,010, 58,021 (2001).  As discussed above, “inability
to ambulate effectively” is now required for any musculoskeletal impairment.  Given the
fact that Denzel generally participated in gym and walked home from school, a reasonable
8mind could conclude that, despite his condition, Denzel did not meet this requirement. 
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Denzel was not unable
to ambulate effectively.  
Ms. Morrison also argues that the ALJ failed to consider Denzel’s three
impairments in combination with one another and that we should therefore remand with
instructions for him to do so.  The ALJ, however, explicitly indicated a number of times
that he was considering the impairments in combination.  (App. 25, 27, 28.)  We see no
reason not to believe him. 
Finally, Ms. Morrison contends that the ALJ’s functional equivalence analysis was
conclusory and maintains that Denzel’s condition is in fact functionally equivalent to the
listings.  Specifically, she asserts that Denzel suffers from marked limitations in four
domains:  relating with others, moving about and manipulating objects, caring for one’s
self, and health and well-being.  
We conclude that the ALJ’s explanation of why Denzel had either no limitation or
a less-than-marked limitation in each of these four domains was sufficient “to permit
meaningful review,” see Jones, 364 F.3d at 505, and, moreover, that his ultimate findings
are supported by substantial evidence.  Regarding the domain of interacting and relating
with others, the ALJ referred back to his thorough analysis of why Denzel’s condition
was not medically equivalent to the listings for mood and affective disorders.  Regarding
the domain of moving about and manipulating objects, the ALJ referred back to his more-
9than-sufficient analyses of why Denzel’s condition did not meet the listings for asthma
and was not medically equivalent to analogous listings for musculoskeletal impairments. 
Regarding the domain of caring for oneself, the ALJ referred back again to his in-depth
comparison of Denzel’s condition to the listings for mood and affective disorders.  Lastly,
the domain of health and physical well-being contemplates “the cumulative physical
effects of physical or mental impairments and their associated treatments or therapies on
[the child’s] functioning” that were not considered under the domain of moving about and
manipulating objects.  20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(l).  Here, the ALJ referred once more to his
prior discussion of why Denzel’s condition neither met the listings for asthma nor
medically equaled the listings for musculoskeletal impairments and, again, gave
substantial weight to the DDS doctors’ opinions.  In explaining his conclusion, the ALJ
acknowledged that pain caused by Denzel’s exostoses sometimes wakes him up at night
and has caused him to be absent from school for significant periods of time; however, the
ALJ also highlighted the fact that special accommodations, including home-tutoring, have
been provided to allow Denzel to continue to attend school and that the treatment he has
received since February 2003 — a combination of physical therapy, rest, alcohol rubs,
and occasional non-narcotic prescription medication — provide him with some relief
from his pain.
For the reasons discussed above, we will AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. 
